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Articles
THE ADVERSE IMPACT OF TRUTH-INSENTENCING ON WISCONSIN’S EFFORTS TO
DEAL WITH LOW-LEVEL DRUG OFFENDERS
Lynn Adelman∗
I. INTRODUCTION
I thank the Valparaiso University Law School for the opportunity to
participate in an important discussion about how we can most effectively
address the problem of low-level drug offenders. This issue is timely
because of the harmful consequences that many jurisdictions’ sentencing
practices have brought about, particularly in the African-American
community.1 I will attempt to contribute to the discussion by exploring
Wisconsin’s experience with a type of determinate sentencing that many
states have adopted in recent decades known as truth in sentencing
(“TIS”). My interest in Wisconsin’s TIS law stems both from my
experience as a federal district judge (1997–present) and as a Wisconsin
state senator (1977–1997). As a district judge, I have had to deal with the
federal version of determinate sentencing embodied in the Sentencing
Reform Act (“SRA”), the federal sentencing guidelines, and statutes
establishing mandatory minimum sentences in drug cases.2 I have long
been convinced that the federal sentencing laws and guidelines result in
an enormous amount of over-punishment, particularly in drug cases.

∗

Lynn Adelman is a U.S. District Judge in the Eastern District of Wisconsin. Judge
Adelman thanks Jonah Kind and Barbara Fritschel for their research assistance and
Meredith Ross for her helpful comments.
1
See generally Donna K. Axel & David M. Rosen, Putting Two Drug Courts to the Top Ten
Test: Comparing Essex and Denver Drug Courts with “The Carey Team’s” Best Practices, 47 VAL.
U. L. REV. 839 (2013) (evaluating the effectiveness of various drug courts to reduce
recidivism); Jeanne Bishop, Where the Rubber Meets the Road: Injecting Mercy into a System of
Justice, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 819 (2013) (discussing her experiences as a public defender in
Cook County, Illinois, and how devastating the effects of the drug war have been on the
African-American community); Brian G. Gilmore & Reginald Dwayne Betts, Deconstructing
Carmona: The U.S. War on Drugs and Black Men as Non-Citizens, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 777 (2013)
(exploring how the war on drugs has affected the African-American community).
2
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3661–3672 (2006)). See generally Mark Osler, Amoral Numbers and
Narcotics Sentencing, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 755, 755 (2013) (“[T]he arbitrary mandatory
minimums and sentencing guidelines . . . have too often created broad and often tragic
outcomes in our society.”).
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Wisconsin enacted its TIS law in 1998.3 I thought that it might be useful
to explore how TIS came to be enacted in Wisconsin and to consider
whether the law has had negative consequences similar to those
resulting from the SRA. Unfortunately, as discussed below, I conclude
that it has.
Like many states, when Wisconsin enacted TIS, it abandoned an
indeterminate sentencing system that had been in effect for many years.
Under the indeterminate system, most offenders became eligible for
parole after serving 25% of their sentence and had to be paroled after
serving two-thirds of it.4 When it enacted TIS, however, Wisconsin
abolished parole.5 It also abolished the right of an offender to earn credit
for good behavior (“good time”) while in prison.6 Under TIS, when a
judge sentences an offender to prison, the judge imposes a bifurcated
sentence consisting of a term of confinement of at least one year followed
by a term of extended supervision (“ES”) in the community.7 In addition
to requiring offenders to serve their entire term of confinement, TIS
established harsh rules regarding ES. The ES portion of the bifurcated
sentence has to be at least 25% as long as the term of confinement.8
Further, offenders who violate ES and are returned to prison receive no
sentence credit for time successfully served on ES prior to the violation.9
Wisconsin’s TIS law is as harsh as any in the country. By abolishing
parole and good time, the law has led to a substantial increase in
Wisconsin’s prison population and to skyrocketing corrections costs.10
TIS has especially harmed efforts to deal constructively with low-level
drug offenders. The absence of readily available opportunities for early
release deprives many offenders of an incentive to address substance
abuse problems. Also, the increased incarceration caused by TIS absorbs
funds that could otherwise be used for drug treatment both for offenders
in the prison system and on ES. Further, the long periods of ES and the
lapses that drug offenders frequently suffer ensnare many offenders in a

3
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 973.01 et. seq. (West 2007); Thomas J. Hammer, The Long and
Arduous Journey to Truth-in-Sentencing in Wisconsin, 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 15, 15 (2002). See
generally Jessica M. Eaglin, Neorehabilitation and Indiana’s Sentencing Reform Dilemma, 47 VAL.
U. L. REV. 867 (2013) (discussing Indiana’s struggle to reform its sentencing practices).
4
Hammer, supra note 3, at 15 & 18 n.4.
5
WIS. STAT. § 973.01(6); Hammer, supra note 3, at 15.
6
Michael B. Brennan & Donald V. Latorraca, Truth-in-Sentencing Comes to Wisconsin,
WIS. LAW., May 2000, at 14, 17.
7
Id. at 16.
8
Id. at 17.
9
Id. at 56.
10
Mary Zahn & Gina Barton, Locked in: The Price of Truth in Sentencing (Pt. 1),
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 21, 2004, at 1.
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vicious cycle of incarceration and reincarceration. The system might
fairly be described as prison on the installment plan.
In the first section of this Article, I discuss how TIS came to be
enacted in Wisconsin, and, in the second, I assess in more detail the
impact that it has had.
II. THE ENACTMENT OF TIS
In 1994, Congress enacted the Violent Crime Control & Law
Enforcement Act.11 The Act included a provision known as the Violent
Offender Incarceration and Truth-in-Sentencing Incentive Program
(“VOI/TIS”).12 VOI/TIS was part of an ongoing federal effort to ensure
that sentences in criminal cases were both determinate and harsh. Ten
years earlier, Congress had enacted the SRA, which abolished parole and
substantially restricted the availability of good time at the federal level.13
The VOI/TIS program provided incentives for states to adopt similar
laws, offering funding to any state that required offenders who
committed violent crimes to serve at least 85% of the sentence specified
by the sentencing judge.14 The law did not require states to establish
determinate sentences for non-violent offenses, including drug crimes.
Some states enacted TIS laws before the federal program took effect, but
the program encouraged more to do so. By 2002, forty states had
enacted TIS laws.15
In Wisconsin, federal funding was only a small part of the TIS story.
Individual political ambition played a bigger role. As stated, before
Wisconsin enacted a TIS law, it had an indeterminate sentencing system
in which parole played an important part. An agency known as the
Wisconsin Parole Commission administered the parole system. The
Commission was chaired by an appointee of the governor, who served at
11
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2, 15, 16, 18, 21, 28, 31);
Joseph P. Tartaro, The Great Assault Weapon Hoax, 20 DAYTON L. REV. 619, 619 (1995).
12
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 §§ 20101 et seq.;
Environmental Impact Review Procedures for the VOI/TIS Grant Program, 65 Fed. Reg.
48,592 (Aug. 8, 2000) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 91).
13
See generally WILLIAM W. WILKINS, JR., ET AL., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM (1991) (providing the origins of mandatory minimum penalties and then evaluating
their effectiveness).
14
Paula M. Ditton & Doris James Wilson, Special Report: Truth in Sentencing in State
Prisons, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. 3 (Jan. 1999), http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/
pdf/tssp.pdf.
15
Joe Fontaine, A History of Wisconsin Sentencing—Part XVI, CORRECTIONS SENT’G (Mar.
27, 2007, 12:00 PM), http://correctionssentencing.blogspot.com/2007/03/history-ofwisconsin-sentencing-part_27.html.
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the governor’s pleasure.16 The other members of the Commission,
however, were state employees with civil service protection.17 The fact
that the governor appointed the chair of the Commission ensured that
the Commission was accountable to the electorate. The fact that the
commissioners had civil service protection was also important, because it
meant that commissioners did not have to fear losing their job if they
made a parole decision that didn’t work out well. Thus, the system
blended political accountability and professionalism. The underlying
idea was to de-politicize parole decisions and, insofar as possible, ensure
that they were made on the merits.
The commissioners traveled throughout Wisconsin interviewing
prisoners who were coming up for consideration for parole and making
recommendations to the Chair. The Commission’s procedures and the
manner in which it could exercise discretion were governed by written
policies.18 In addition, the Commission was able to use its release
authority to attempt to ensure that offenders with comparable records,
offenses, and institutional conduct would serve approximately the same
amount of time. The system generally worked well. Interested persons
were aware of the policies and criteria that governed parole decisions or
could easily discover them. Anybody who cared could find out when a
prisoner was coming up for parole. In addition, victims were notified of
parole hearings and could provide input.19 Thus, to characterize the
system as something other than truth-in-sentencing, as TIS proponents
did, was highly misleading.
Nevertheless, in the United States, criminal justice issues are very
politicized. And the fact that tough-on-crime politics had been in vogue
for several decades and that other states were adopting TIS laws made
Wisconsin’s indeterminate sentencing system an attractive target for
candidates for statewide office looking for issues to run on in 1994. This
was so despite statistics showing that in 1993 crime rates had dropped in
almost every category of violent crime.20 Thus, in 1994, candidates
challenging incumbents in campaigns for governor and attorney general
came out strongly for enacting a TIS law. Democratic State Senate
Majority Leader Chuck Chvala, the challenger to Republican Governor
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 15.145(l) (West 2012) (allowing for the governor to appoint the
chairperson); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 17.07(3m) (West 2003) (providing the governor with the
power to remove the chairperson).
17
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 15.145(l) (explaining that the other members who were appointed
by the chairperson will serve a two-year term).
18
WIS. ADMIN. CODE PAC §§ 1.01 et seq. (1995).
19
WIS. ADMIN. CODE PAC § 1.05(2).
20
Dennis McCann, Election-year Rhetoric Takes the Bite out of Upbeat Statistics on Crime,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 3, 1994.
16
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Tommy Thompson, reinvented himself as a tough-on-crime politician
and advocated eliminating parole for twenty-seven violent felonies.21
Ironically, Chvala himself later went to jail after being charged with
various kinds of official misconduct.22 Chvala’s assembly counterpart,
Republican Assembly Speaker Scott Jensen, another vocal TIS supporter,
was also convicted of a crime involving misconduct in office.23 In any
case, Tommy Thompson, although an overwhelming favorite in the race
against Chvala, had no intention of allowing himself to be outdone in the
tough-on-crime department. Thus, he responded to Chvala’s TIS
proposal by proclaiming that he supported abolishing parole, not just for
certain specified offenses, but for all offenses.24
And even though the attorney general in Wisconsin has almost
nothing to do with prosecuting street crime, the Republican challenger to
Democratic Attorney General Jim Doyle, Jeff Wagner, a former Assistant
U.S. Attorney and now a right wing talk radio host, ran a tough-on-crime
campaign calling for the elimination of parole. Wagner characterized
parole as a “cruel joke” on the public and opined that dangerous people
were being released “way too soon.”25 Doyle responded that parole
should be subject to strict standards.26 The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel
called the theme of the 1994 election “A Salute to Crime Busting” and
lamented that the candidates would not let statistics get in the way of
their tough-on-crime rhetoric.27
Incumbents Thompson and Doyle were both re-elected, and, for a
while after the 1994 election, neither said much about TIS. Thompson
appointed a task force to explore sentencing and corrections issues but
expressed little interest in promoting TIS.28 However, in late 1996,
Doyle, who by this time was contemplating a run for governor, released

21
Steve Schultze, Thompson Wants Parole to Halt for All State Crimes, MILWAUKEE J.,
Sept. 26, 1994.
22
Chuck Chvala Timeline, CHANNEL3000 (last updated Dec. 15, 2005, 12:24 PM),
http://www.channel3000.com/news/Chuck-Chvala-Timeline/-/1648/8290248/-/hlxqeez
/-/index.html.
23
Ann Babe, Jensen Officially Leaves Post, THE BADGER HERALD (Mar. 22, 2006, 12:00 AM),
http://badgerherald.com/news/2006/03/22/jensen_officially_le.php.
24
Schultze, supra note 21 (“‘When a police officer captures a criminal and a judge sends
him to prison, he should stay there until his full sentence is served—period,’ [Gov.]
Thompson said in his speech to the Wisconsin Professional Police Association.”).
25
Craig Gilbert, Doyle Faces Republican Challenger, MILWAUKEE J., Mar. 1, 1994; Eldon
Knoche, Wagner Due to Announce Candidacy for Attorney General, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL,
Mar. 1, 1994, at 5A.
26
Gilbert, supra note 25 (“Doyle does not favor total abolition of parole, but has said it
should be subject to tight standards.”).
27
McCann, supra note 20.
28
Fontaine, supra note 15.
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a fully developed TIS proposal.29 Doyle’s plan contemplated that only
model inmates could be considered for parole and only after they had
served 85% of their sentences.30 He argued that TIS would “build public
confidence in the corrections system.”31 Doyle also proposed creating a
sentencing commission to gather data and assist judges in modifying
their sentencing practices to reflect the changes that a TIS law would
bring about.32 He also advocated allocating 1% of the corrections budget
to child abuse prevention.33
Thompson, who perceived Doyle as a threat, responded with what
he characterized as an “absolute” TIS proposal and included it in his
1997–98 budget bill.34 Thompson dismissed Doyle’s proposal as “not
real truth-in-sentencing” and supported abolishing parole entirely and
requiring all offenders to serve 100% of their sentence.35 Other political
actors also weighed in. Judge Patrick Crooks, campaigning for a seat on
the Wisconsin Supreme Court, called for certainty in sentencing.36
Milwaukee Mayor John Norquist suggested that parole be eliminated
and unveiled a “Parole Stop” program calling for the City to oppose the
early release of many inmates.37 Victims’ rights groups also initiated a
petition drive supporting Doyle’s TIS proposal.
Thus, the political momentum in support of TIS grew, even though
Wisconsin’s crime rate continued to fall. Between 1993 and 1998, the
crime rate fell by almost 15%.38 However, partisan differences remained.
Besides Thompson, the principal Republican proponent of TIS was State
Representative and future Governor, Scott Walker. Walker argued that
TIS would provide the public with certainty about how much time an
offender would serve in prison and would allow elected judges to make
decisions about the length of incarceration rather than the unaccountable

Id.
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.; see also Alan J. Borsuk, Thompson, Doyle Differ on Sentencing Overhaul, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, May 25, 1997, at 14A (“[Doyle] added, ‘What we clearly need is a commission
that has a very direct and limited charge to revamp the penalties in our criminal code to
put in effect truth in sentencing.’”).
33
Fontaine, supra note 15.
34
A.B. 100, 1997-98 Leg. (Wis. 1997).
35
Fontaine, supra note 15.
36
Richard P. Jones, Crooks Campaigning for Tough Crime Laws, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Jan. 26, 1996.
37
Richard P. Jones, State Tab for Norquist Plan to End Parole Is Put at $35.7 Million,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 9, 1996, at 5B.
38
Wisconsin Crime Rates 1960–2011, THE DISASTER CTR., http://www.disastercenter.
com/crime/wicrime.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2013). In 1993, 204,244 total crimes were
recorded in Wisconsin, and, in 1998, 185,093 total crimes were recorded. Id.
29
30
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Wisconsin Parole Commission.39 Walker denied that TIS was intended
However, unlike Doyle’s proposal,
to make sentences longer.40
Thompson’s proposal did not include a sentencing commission to assist
judges in modifying their sentencing practices to take the abolition of
parole into account.41 Walker argued that the elimination of parole
would automatically cause judges to impose lower sentences.42
Although Democrats declined to debate the ideas underlying the TIS
proposal—that the parole system failed to provide the public with
sufficient certainty about sentences and that judges, rather than the
Parole Commission, should decide when prisoners should be released—
they criticized features of the Republican plan.
They disputed
Republican claims that offenders would not serve longer sentences
under TIS and argued that the state prison population and state
The partisan
corrections costs would increase substantially.43
disagreement led to the removal of TIS from the budget bill.44 In May
1997, however, Walker and others introduced the Republican TIS
proposal as a separate bill, Assembly Bill 351, which ultimately became
the vehicle by which TIS was enacted in Wisconsin.
The American Legislative Exchange Council (“ALEC”) also played
an important role in bringing TIS to Wisconsin. ALEC is an organization
that brings together fee-paying corporations and conservative state
legislators to develop “model” legislative proposals.45 Its primary
purpose is to develop bills that benefit its corporate members and further
conservative causes.46 For example, ALEC has promoted “stand your
ground” self-defense laws of the type at issue in the case involving the
Joe Fontaine, A History of Wisconsin—Part XVII, CORRECTIONS SENT’G (Mar. 30, 2007,
2:48 PM), http://correctionssentencing.blogspot.com/2007/03/history-of-wisconsin-partxvii.html.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id. (“Republicans repeatedly claimed that judges would control sentences on their
own. Rep. Mark Green . . . argued that judges ‘who have been giving out longer sentences
in order to make sure inmates serve a specific time behind bars would probably give
shorter sentences’ if offenders were guaranteed to serve their full terms.”).
43
Joe Fontaine, A History of Wisconsin Sentencing—Part XVIII, CORRECTIONS SENT’G (Apr.
2, 2007, 9:14 AM), http://correctionssentencing.blogspot.com/2007/04/history-ofwisconsin-sentencing-part.html.
44
Joe Fontaine, A History of Wisconsin Sentencing—Part XIX, CORRECTIONS SENT’G (Apr.
9, 2007, 2:41 PM), http://correctionssentencing.blogspot.com/2007/04/history-ofwisconsin-sentencing-part_09.html.
45
Rachel Weiner, How ALEC Became a Political Liability, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/how-alec-became-a-politicalliability/2012/04/24/gIQA3QnyeT_blog.html
46
Frequently Asked Questions, ALEC.ORG, http://www.alec.org/about-alec/frequentlyasked-questions/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
39
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death of Trayvon Martin, and “show me your papers” laws, such as
Arizona adopted as part of its effort to deal with illegal immigration.47
For decades, the National Rifle Association has “helped bankroll ALEC
operations and even co-chaired ALEC’s ‘Public Safety and Elections Task
Force[]’ . . . .”48
During the 1990s, the Corrections Corporation of America (“CCA”),
the country’s largest operator of private prisons, was an active member
of ALEC and pushed for the development of legislation that would
increase the number of people incarcerated.49 Among the bills that
ALEC developed was a model TIS law. In 1995 alone, ALEC’s TIS
proposal was signed into law in twenty-five states.50 Scott Walker was a
member of ALEC, and the TIS bill that he introduced was based on
ALEC’s model law.51 Walker also used statistics and talking points
developed by ALEC to argue in support of his proposal.52
Walker’s TIS bill passed the Assembly, but ran into trouble in the
Democratic-controlled Senate.53 As discussed, the Senate was not
opposed to TIS, but only to the harsh Republican version of it. The
Senate passed a TIS bill which required offenders to serve 75% rather
than 100% of their sentence in custody.54 The Assembly killed the Senate
version of TIS, characterizing it as a proposal that would “put criminals
back on the street faster,” a curious statement in view of the assertion
Ultimately,
that TIS was about certainty rather than severity.55
Thompson and Doyle sat down and negotiated a TIS bill, and Thompson
clearly got the better of Doyle in the negotiations. Doyle agreed to accept
Thompson’s proposal that offenders be required to serve 100% of their
sentence. In return, Thompson agreed to very little—a committee to
address implementation issues and an increase in child abuse prevention
funding.56 The legislature proceeded to pass the Thompson-Doyle

47
Weiner, supra note 45; John M. Gilionna, Arizona Immigration: ‘Show Me Your Papers’
Enforcement to Begin, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/18/
nation/la-na-nn-arizona-immigration-20120918.
48
Lisa Graves, Backgrounder: The History of the NRA/ALEC Gun Agenda, PR WATCH (Dec.
15, 2012, 12:32 PM), http://www.prwatch.org/news/2012/12/11908/nraalec-reactionarygun-agenda.
49
Mike Elk & Bob Sloan, The Hidden History of ALEC and Prison Labor, THE NATION (Aug.
1,
2011),
http://www.thenation.com/article/162478/hidden-history-alec-and-prisonlabor#.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Fontaine, supra note 44.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Fontaine, supra note 15.
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“compromise,” and, in June 1998, Thompson signed it into law
“proclaiming that it was ‘not a good day for the bad guys in Wisconsin,’”
another odd statement given the stated purpose of the law.57
Several points about the emergence and enactment of TIS legislation
in Wisconsin are worth further mention. First, few, if any, legislators
made an effort to defend indeterminate sentencing, notwithstanding that
the indeterminate sentencing system had served Wisconsin well for
many years. One argument against TIS laws is that it does not make
sense to impose a punishment on an offender who is say 18, and never
modify it no matter how much the offender may change in subsequent
years. Put differently, the argument is that a system that imposes the
identical punishment on prisoners, without regard to their performance
in prison, creates less prisoner accountability than a system that rewards
prisoners who attempt to rehabilitate themselves. Undoubtedly, this
was a difficult argument to make, particularly when a Republican
governor and a Democratic attorney general both supported the
abolition of parole and good time. But legislators were clearly reluctant
even to suggest that some prisoners actually change for the better and
that one of the responsibilities of an effective corrections system is to
encourage such change.
Second, during roughly the same period in which TIS was enacted,
police in Milwaukee County began to arrest a large number of low-level
crack offenders.58 At the same time, the Milwaukee County District
Attorney adopted a policy of seeking prison sentences in almost all drug
cases.59 Further, judges in Milwaukee County began to express a lack of
confidence in the probation system.60 The result of these occurrences
was that very few low-level drug offenders in Milwaukee County
received sentences of probation.61 Wisconsin judges generally sentenced
low-level “possession with intent to sell” drug offenders to about two
years.62 But in counties other than Milwaukee, judges generally placed
the offenders on probation first.63 Thus, the prison sentence took effect
only if probation was revoked. Milwaukee County judges, however,

Joe Fontaine, A History of Wisconsin Sentencing–Part XX, CORRECTIONS SENT’G (Apr. 13,
2007, 9:04 AM), http://correctionssentencing.blogspot.com/2007/04/history-of-wisconsinsentencing-part-xx.html.
58
JUDITH GREENE & KEVIN PRANIS, JUST. STRATEGIES, TREATMENT INSTEAD OF PRISONS: A
ROADMAP FOR SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONAL POLICY REFORM IN WISCONSIN 31 (2006).
59
Id. at 33.
60
Id. at 22.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 46.
63
Id. at 22.
57
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sent most of these drug offenders directly to prison.64 Thus, Milwaukee
County put more offenders in prison than all other counties put
together.65 Further, some 80% to 90% of those Milwaukee County
Unfortunately, neither the
imprisoned were African-Americans.66
governor, the attorney general, nor the legislature made any effort to
address the perceived problems with probation in Milwaukee County or
the disproportionate imprisonment of low-level drug offenders who
were African-American. Instead, they chose to focus on enacting TIS.
Third, there is an interesting parallel in the way that Wisconsin
supporters of TIS promoted their bill and the way proponents of the SRA
operated. In both cases, proponents attempted to avoid placing primary
emphasis on the fact that their proposals would result in much harsher
sentences. In the case of TIS, supporters like Walker emphasized that the
bill would create certainty about how much time offenders would serve
in prison and that this would be an important public benefit. Proponents
of the SRA also downplayed the punitive nature of their bill, stressing
instead that it would reduce sentencing disparity and that this too would
constitute an important public benefit.67 Both the certainty argument
and the reducing disparity argument sounded relatively neutral and
made the bills in question seem almost like good government bills,
rather than legislation that would imprison a vast number of people—
mostly African-Americans—for a very long time. Although clearly
aware that the principal appeal of their bills was to the public’s punitive
impulses, proponents seemed to want to avoid making the appeal
embarrassingly blatant. Thus, they came up with catchy but misleading
labels like “truth-in-sentencing” and “sentencing reform.”
In some states, like New York, policymakers have considerably
reduced prison populations by establishing effective alternatives to
prison for many drug offenders.68 In the late 1990s and early 2000s,
however, Wisconsin was not among them. Wisconsin has a history of
progressivism in addressing criminal justice issues. For example, it

Id.
Id.
66
Jesse J. Norris, The Earned Release Revolution: Early Assessments and State-Level
Strategies, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1551, 1588 n.171 (2012).
67
S. REP. NO. 98-1030, at 41–50 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3224–33.
68
Mary Beth Pfeiffer, Analysis: NY Prison Population’s Dramatic Drop, NBC N.Y. (Oct. 16,
2011, 12:58 PM), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Rockefeller-Drug-Laws-40Years-Later-Prison-Population-Drug-Law-Reform-Act-131946193.html (following a change
of course in New York state drug policies, there was a sixty percent decline in inmates
serving for drug crimes between 2000 and 2011).
64
65
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abolished the death penalty in 1853 and has never reinstated it.69 But in
recent years, Wisconsin has been far from progressive.
III. THE IMPACT OF TIS
In the decade after it took effect, TIS created so many problems that
the legislature had to revise it at least three times.70 It is not an
exaggeration to say that the legislature’s work on TIS provides an
excellent case study in how not to legislate. First, when it enacted TIS,
the legislature delayed the law’s effective date until the end of 1999 to
allow time to develop supplemental legislation that presumably had to
be passed before TIS took effect.71 The legislature also created a Criminal
Penalties Study Committee (“CPSC”) to draft such legislation. The CPSC
was intended to identify and propose changes made necessary by TIS
and to provide sentencing guidance to judges in a world in which
offenders could no longer be paroled.
The expectation was that post-TIS sentences would be structured so
that confinement periods would approximate the time offenders served
in prison under the parole system. In August 1999, the CPSC
recommended numerous changes, including: (1) the establishment of a
new crime classification system with nine classes of offenses; (2) advisory
sentencing guidelines; and (3) a sentencing commission to collect data
The CPSC based the new
about judicial sentencing practices.72
maximum periods of confinement on the time that offenders served
before reaching their mandatory parole date under the old law.73 Of
course, the CPSC could not ensure that judges would modify their
sentencing practices to reflect that prisoners would no longer be paroled.
Notwithstanding that the CPSC bill was supposed to be essential to
TIS, it was not enacted until two and a half years after TIS took effect.74
The CPSC legislation stalled because the Senate Judiciary Committee
Chair, Gary George, who represented an African-American district in
Milwaukee’s inner city, sought changes in the bill. George correctly
perceived that under TIS offenders would serve much more time in
prison than they had under indeterminate sentencing and wanted to use

69
Alexander T. Pendleton & Blaine R. Renfert, A Brief History of Wisconsin’s Death
Penalty, WIS. LAW., 2003, http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Search&
template=/cm/htmldisplay.cfm&contentid=50092.
70
2001 Wis. Act 109 §§ 1114–31; 2003 Wis. Act 33 §§ 2749–51; 2005 Wis. Act 277 §§ 88–89.
71
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 973.01(1) (West 2007); Fontaine, supra note 57.
72
Hammer, supra note 3, at 16–17.
73
Id. at 16.
74
2001 Wis. Act 109.
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the CPSC bill to soften TIS.75 Among other changes, George wanted to
add provisions allowing judges to modify inmates’ sentences based on
new information and to adjust the sentences of elderly inmates who
were not a threat to public safety.76 George’s efforts mostly failed, but he
did obtain a revision allowing certain offenders to petition the
sentencing judge for early release after having served 75% or 85% of
their sentence, depending on the seriousness of their offense.77
In practice, however, George’s early release provision had little
effect. This was so because the pro-punishment forces insisted on a
provision authorizing the prosecutor and, in some cases, the victim to
veto any sentence adjustment.78 Prosecutorial vetoes became routine and
few inmates obtained early release. The prosecutor’s veto was ultimately
held to violate the separation of powers and is now void, although the
statute has not changed.79 The victim’s veto has never been litigated,
although it too would likely be found unconstitutional.
George’s holding up of the CPSC bill, however, caused serious harm
to the thousands of offenders who had the misfortune to be sentenced in
the two and a half years that elapsed between TIS’s taking effect and the
enactment of the CPSC bill. These offenders were sentenced under a
penalty structure that had not been modified to reflect the abolition of
parole. As the reporter for the committee that drafted the CPSC bill
wrote, “[I]t is difficult to imagine a more dreadful way to transition”
from indeterminate sentencing to determinate sentencing.80
At this point, at least for a short period of time, the legislature
stepped away from TIS. However, the law had created numerous
problems that cried out to be addressed. In 2004, the Milwaukee Journal
Sentinel published a series of articles entitled Locked in: The Price of Truth
in Sentencing, which focused on the costs of the new law.81 The series
projected that TIS’s cost would be enormous and pointed out that before
enacting TIS, the legislature had not bothered to obtain an estimate of the
fiscal impact that the law would have.82 The series prompted lawmakers
to promise reforms, but none immediately materialized.

Hammer, supra note 3, at 17; Joe Fontaine, A History of Wisconsin Sentencing—Part
XXXI, CORRECTIONS SENT’G (June 18, 2007, 4:33 PM), http://correctionssentencing.
blogspot.com/2007/06/history-of-wisconsin-sentencing-part_18.html.
76
Fontaine, supra note 75.
77
Hammer, supra note 3, at 17.
78
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 973.195(c)–(d) (West 2007); 2001 Wis. Act 109 § 1143m.
79
State v. Stenklyft, 697 N.W.2d 769 (Wis. 2005).
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Hammer, supra note 3, at 17.
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Zahn & Barton, supra note 10.
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In 2008, however, Doyle, who had been elected governor after
Thompson, became a member of President George W. Bush’s
administration, and a number of concerned legislators asked the Council
of State Governments’ Justice Center (“Justice Center”) to study TIS.83
As governor, Doyle was responsible for paying for TIS, and his attitude
toward the law changed considerably. Unsurprisingly, Doyle became far
less enthusiastic about TIS than he had been when he was attorney
general and a soon to be candidate for governor. Although the Justice
Center did not expressly recommend that parole be reinstated, it might
as well have in that it proposed that the legislature create a number of
new vehicles by which inmates could obtain early release from prison. It
also recommended limiting ES to 75% of confinement time for most
offenders and limiting reconfinement time to six months for offenders
whose ES was revoked for reasons other than having committed a new
offense.84
Based largely on the Justice Center’s recommendations, the
legislature proceeded to enact a TIS reform package.85 The package
included a number of avenues by which inmates could earn early
release, and it authorized the Department of Corrections to release nonviolent offenders to ES up to a year prior to their scheduled release date
and to release elderly prisoners and those with extraordinary health
conditions.86 It also allowed offenders who successfully completed two
years of ES to terminate supervision.87
Unfortunately, each of the various early release programs involved
different procedures and was governed by different standards. In
addition, the programs overlapped. Thus, prisoners seeking to obtain
early release, almost all of whom were without counsel, found the
application process extremely complicated and confusing. Further, the
Department of Corrections took several years to come up with
administrative rules to govern each of the early release programs. And
by the time the administrative rules were ready, the effort to reform TIS
was destroyed entirely. This was so because, in 2010, Scott Walker
succeeded Doyle as governor, and the Republicans took control of both

JUSTICE CTR., JUSTICE REINVESTMENT IN WISCONSIN: ANALYSES & POLICY OPTIONS TO
REDUCE SPENDING ON CORRECTIONS AND INCREASE PUBLIC SAFETY 1 (2009), available at
http://justicereinvestment.org/states/wisconsin/pubmaps-wi.
84
Id. at 5.
85
2009 Wis. Act 28 §§ 3378–81.
86
Michael B. Brennan, The Pendulum Swings: No More Early Release, WIS. LAW., Sept.
2011, at 4, 7, available at http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Wisconsin_
Lawyer&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&contentid=105392.
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Id.
83
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houses of the legislature.88 With Walker’s encouragement, the new
legislature promptly enacted a law repealing almost all of the provisions
in the Justice Center’s reform package.89
Thus, after more than a decade of legislating, the TIS law today is
pretty much the law that Thompson and Walker proposed in the late
1990s and that the legislature enacted with Doyle’s approval. As the law
stands, felons receive a bifurcated sentence consisting of a term of
confinement and a term of ES. In determining the length of the
confinement period, the judge is constrained by the statutory maximum.
Prisoners typically serve 100% of their term of confinement and
offenders who violate ES are often re-confined.90 Although there are
some limits on the length of the initial ES term, many offenders serve
very long periods of ES. Obtaining early release is extremely difficult.
Prisoners with substance abuse problems may obtain early release by
participating in a boot camp program that pre-dated TIS, but spots in the
program are hard to come by. Prisoners can apply for early release after
serving 75% or 85% of their sentence, depending on their offense, but
very few succeed.91 Many judges are reluctant to grant early release, and
offenders can only apply once. The Department of Corrections may
release elderly or sick prisoners but rarely does so.92
As mentioned, Wisconsin’s TIS law is very harsh. First, unlike many
jurisdictions which require offenders to serve 75% or 85% of their
confinement time, Wisconsin requires inmates to serve 100%.93 Second,
Wisconsin’s law applies not only to offenders who commit violent
crimes, but to all offenders, including those who commit drug offenses.94
Third, Wisconsin permits no credit for good time, while at the same time
it punishes for bad time. It does so by adding confinement time to the

88
Jennifer C. Kerr, State Elections: Republicans Gain Control of Key State Legislatures,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 3, 2010, 4:37 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/03/
state-elections-legislatures_n_778103.html?; Wisconsin: GOP Wins Senate, House, Gov. Seats,
Ousting Feingold, USA TODAY (Nov. 3, 2010, 3:03 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
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of power in Wisconsin politics during the 2010 elections).
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2011 Wis. Act. 38 §§ 88–91.
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Brennan, supra note 86, at 6.
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confinement period of an offender who misbehaves.95 Fourth, Wisconsin
bars offenders whose ES is revoked from receiving sentence credit for
time they previously served successfully on ES.96 These features set
Wisconsin’s law apart.
The law has led to a large increase in Wisconsin’s prison population
and dramatically affected the state’s budget. In 2004, the Milwaukee
Journal Sentinel estimated that, as the result of TIS, the biennial cost of
corrections in Wisconsin would rise from $700 million in 1999 to $1.8
billion by 2025.97 As it turned out, the Journal Sentinel’s estimate was far
too low. Walker’s 2011–2013 budget allocated $2.25 billion dollars to the
Department of Corrections.98 For the first time in history, Wisconsin
budgeted more money for prisons than for the University of Wisconsin
System.99 As recently as 1992, the University’s budget was three times as
large as the state’s corrections budget.100 At present, the only state
programs that involve larger expenditures than corrections are aid to
schools and local governments and medical assistance.101
The Journal Sentinel’s analysis concluded that, aside from cost, TIS
had other negative effects. Because of the increased number of prisoners
and the shortage of prison programming, “thousands of inmates are on
waiting lists for prison jobs, education and treatment programs.”102
Wardens reported that TIS led to increases in bad conduct by inmates
and feelings of hopelessness precipitated by the lack of an opportunity to
earn good time credit and obtain early release.103 The wardens also
noted that it was difficult to motivate inmates to participate in substance
abuse treatment programs while in prison because of the absence of an
incentive.104 At one prison, 168 offenders refused to take part in a
treatment program and 131 of these were TIS inmates.105 Of course,
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 302.11(2) (West 2010).
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 302.113(9)(am) (West 2010).
97
Zahn & Barton, supra note 10.
98
Alison Bauter, As Priorities Shift, Corrections Budget Passes UW System, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Aug. 16, 2012, http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/wisconsincorrections-spending-passes-that-of-uw-system-ua62t4k-166039926.html.
99
Id.
100
See Zahn & Barton, supra note 10 (explaining that in a dozen years prior to the 2004
article, the university system was budgeted for three times as much as correctional
facilities).
101
Bauter, supra note 98.
102
Zahn & Barton, supra note 10.
103
Id.
104
Mary Zahn, Inmates Less Motivated, Wardens Find, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 22,
2004, at 14A (“They know they are not going to get out any earlier, so they simply don’t
want to take the time to do the programming and don’t want to invest in it . . . .”) (internal
quotations omitted).
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Id.
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prisoners who do not participate in treatment programs are at greater
risk of substance abuse when released.
The Journal Sentinel also found that, as a result of TIS, offenders
served more time in prison both as a result of their original sentence and
for violations of ES.106 This finding indicated that if judges were
reducing sentences in response to TIS, they were not reducing them
enough to offset the effect of TIS’s elimination of parole. This was
predictable, notwithstanding that Walker and other TIS proponents
denied an interest in lengthening offender sentences. Judges also
imposed lengthy periods of ES, often substantially more than the TIS
minimum of 25% of confinement time.107 This, of course, made it more
likely that offenders would at some point violate the ES portion of their
sentence. It is ironic that Milwaukee County judges, who not long before
had expressed little or no faith in the probation system, frequently
imposed lengthy periods of ES, thus placing offenders under the
supervision of the probation system that they so mistrusted.
The Journal Sentinel also found that, for most inmates, the early
release provisions had little value. Ordinary inmates rarely obtained
early release, and elderly prisoners, even those near death, fared only
slightly better.108 Inmates over sixty-five can petition for early release if
they have served five years or more, and prisoners over sixty may do so
if they have served ten years or more.109 By 2003, the number of elderly
prisoners exceeded 6,500.110 This led to an enormous increase in
prisoners’ medical expenses with the cost exceeding $30 million
annually.111
The 2009 Justice Center Report reached conclusions similar to the
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel’s. The Justice Center found that between 2000
and 2007, Wisconsin’s prison population increased by 14% and that the
average length of confinement increased by 29%.112 The study projected
an additional increase in the prison population of 25% by 2019.113 It also
noted that prisons were overcrowded and that the state would have to
One cause of the increased prison
build additional facilities.114
Id.
Zahn & Barton, supra note 10.
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Mary Zahn & Gina Barton, Door on Early Release Closes Tightly, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Nov. 22, 2004, at 1A, 15A.
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Id. at 15A.
111
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112
See JUSTICE CTR., supra note 83, at 3, 5 (providing a fourteen percent population
increase and an extension of the confinement period from thirty-one months to forty).
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Id. at 3.
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population was the repeated re-incarceration of offenders on
supervision. Under TIS, the average length of post-release supervision
increased by 135%.115 And, by the end of 2007, more than half the prison
population consisted of inmates who had violated supervision, a 40%
increase over pre-TIS numbers.116 In the years since the Justice Center’s
report, prison admissions have declined, but the prison population has
continued to increase.
TIS has particularly undermined Wisconsin’s opportunity to deal
constructively with low-level drug offenders. Most drug offenders have
a substance abuse problem, and many can benefit from effective
treatment. Offenders who complete treatment programs are much less
likely to re-offend than those who do not.117 Thus, good treatment
programs, both within and outside of prisons, are essential if a state is to
deal effectively with drug offenders. As discussed, TIS made it less
likely that such treatment would be available and that, if it was,
offenders would take advantage of it.
The longer incarceration periods brought about by TIS has greatly
harmed the African-American community in Milwaukee. Many young
African-American males experience incarceration, and it has a highly
negative effect on their life prospects. Their employment possibilities are
reduced, they suffer a 30–40% loss of income, their domestic
partnerships are often ruptured, and their marriage prospects
undermined. They also suffer a profound social exclusion, making it
more likely that they will become recidivists and return to prison. In
addition, incarceration divides minority communities, as the experience
of pervasive imprisonment is generally confined to those who are less
educated.118
Thus, TIS has greatly harmed Wisconsin. In recent years, some
public officials have begun to understand this and have taken steps to
mitigate the harm. For example, policymakers have attempted to
develop more effective substance abuse treatment programs that can
serve as alternatives to incarceration. In the 2005–2007 budget, the
legislature created a program known as the Treatment Alternatives and
Diversion (“TAD”) program.119 The legislation authorized “grants to
Id. at 5.
Id. at 4.
117
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counties to enable them to establish and operate programs, including
suspended and deferred prosecution programs and programs based on
principles of restorative justice, that provide alternatives to prosecution
and incarceration for criminal offenders who abuse alcohol or other
drugs.”120 The TAD program currently provides funding to seven
counties, four of which use the money to fund adult drug treatment
The other three, including Milwaukee County, utilize
courts.121
diversion models, in which specialists screen non-violent offenders with
substance abuse problems to determine whether they can be diverted
into community-based substance abuse treatment programs rather than
being sent to prison.122
The program has been quite successful. Offenders who participate
in it are much less likely to be convicted of a new offense within three
years; offenders who complete the program are even less likely to be
convicted.123 The program is also cost effective. One analysis concluded
that every dollar spent on the TAD program brought almost two dollars
in savings as the result of averted incarceration and reduced crime.124
The benefits resulting from offenders obtaining employment are
probably even greater. Wisconsin could benefit greatly by expanding
the TAD program and by creating other substance abuse treatment
programs for offenders. The 2009 Justice Center Report called for
expanding drug and alcohol treatment programs for offenders on ES as a
critical ingredient in a TIS reform package.125 It projected that a
comprehensive program would save the state some $2.3 billion.126
Nevertheless, the problem of effectively addressing the problem of
low-level drug offenders in the context of the TIS law remains.
Wisconsin policymakers have been aware of this problem since TIS went
into effect. Ironically, in its final report, the CPSC noted the “enormous
consumption of prison resources by those convicted of drug offenses, the
KIT R. VAN STELLE, JANAE GOODRICH & JASON PALTZER, UNIV. OF WIS. POPULATION
HEALTH INST., TREATMENT ALTERNATIVES AND DIVERSION (TAD) PROGRAM: ADVANCING
EFFECTIVE DIVERSION IN WISCONSIN 1 (2011), http://uwphi.pophealth.wisc.edu/about/
staff/van-stelle-kit/tad-2011-evaluation-report-exec-summary.pdf (quoting WIS. STAT.
ANN § 16.964(12)(b) (West 2012)).
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29594564.html.
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inadequacy of treatment programs for those who are both convicted and
addicted, and the insufficiency of innovative responses to the drug
problem . . . .”127 The CPSC called for a comprehensive review of the
state’s drug policies regarding treatment, punishment, and enforcement.
State policymakers, unfortunately, have never conducted such a review,
and, after the various revisions of TIS discussed above, the TIS law
remains much as it was when originally enacted and the issues noted by
the CPSC remain largely unaddressed.
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